Test, Test, Test; Lessons learned from experience with mass screening programmes:Advice Note for Independent SAGE by Raffle, Angela E & Taylor-Phillips, S
                          Raffle, A. E., & Taylor-Phillips, S. (2020). Test, Test, Test; Lessons
learned from experience with mass screening programmes: Advice




Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
License (if available):
CC BY-NC-SA
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the final published version of the article (version of record). It first appeared online via Independant SAGE
at https://www.independentsage.org/test-test-test-lessonslearnedfrom-experiencewith-mass-screening-
programmes/. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the
published version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/user-guides/explore-bristol-research/ebr-terms/
1	
Raffle	and	Taylor-Phillips,	Advice	Note	5	June	2020	
Test,	Test,	Test;	Lessons	learned	from	experience	with	mass	screening	
programmes.	
	
Advice	Note	for	Independent	SAGE	5	June	2020	
	
Angela	E.	Raffle,	Consultant	in	Public	Health,	Honorary	Senior	Lecturer,	University	of	
Bristol	School	of	Community	and	Social	Medicine,	UK	
Sian	Taylor-Phillips,	Professor	of	Population	Health,	Warwick	Medical	School	
Department	of	Population	Evidence	and	Technologies.	
	
1.	Preamble	
	
This	advice	note	draws	on	our;	
● 35	years	of	developing,	researching,	delivering,	and	quality	assuring	
screening	programmes,	coupled	with	30	years’	participating	in	communicable	
disease	control	on-call	work,			
● 13	years	experience	conducting,	analyzing,	synthesizing	and	systematically	
reviewing	evidence	related	to	tests	and	population	programmes,	in	support	
of	national	policy	making.	
	
We	hope	that	this	paper,	which	has	been	quickly	prepared,	and	which	feels	like	
‘work	in	progress’,	will	be	of	some	use	to	Independent	SAGE	members.	We	are	well	
aware	that	most	of	you	will	be	familiar	with	many	of	the	concepts	described,	but	
maybe	not	all	members	will	be	familiar	with	all	of	them.		
	
Mass	testing	for	COVID-19	has	the	potential,	if	delivered	to	the	right	people	at	the	
right	time	with	the	right	ongoing	action,	to	bring	benefit.	However,	the	current	
government	policies,	relying	on	fragmented	services	by	inexperienced	providers	
without	integration	into	local	systems	of	care,	risk	poor	delivery	with	consequent	
harm	to	tested	individuals	and	to	the	wider	population,	as	well	as	loss	of	trust	in	
Public	Health	Services.	Independent	SAGE	can	help	to	prevent	this	harm,	by	
supporting	coordinated	high	quality	provision	embedded	in	statutory	services.		
	
2.	Principles	of	testing	in	healthy	people	
	
There	are	common	principles	applicable	both	to	testing	with	the	aim	of	
communicable	disease	control	(CDC)	and	testing	programmes	overseen	by	the	UK	
National	Screening	Programmes	(NSP),	but	there	are	also	profound	differences.	The	
differences	(summarised	briefly	in	Appendix	1)	are	important,	and	relate	principally	
to	timescale,	flexibility,	purpose,	approach,	and	ethical/	legal	framework.		
	
In	practice	of	course	the	separation	between	CDC	and	NSP	is	not	completely	clear-
cut.	For	example	the	UK	NSP	oversees	infectious	disease	screening	in	pregnancy,	
which	has	successfully	helped	bring	transmission	rate	of	HIV	in	infants	born	to	
mothers	living	with	HIV	down	to	0.27%1.		
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3.	Similarities	between	communicable	disease	control	(CDC)	testing	
and	National	Screening	Programmes	(NSP)	
	
The	sheer	scale	of	testing	being	contemplated	for	COVID-19	pandemic	control,	and	
the	length	of	time	that	this	pandemic	(and	potentially	others)	is	likely	to	impact,	
make	it	worthwhile	to	consider	from	the	outset	whether	there	are	good	practice	
principles	relating	to	the	many	mistakes	made	in	the	early	decades	(1950s	to	1980s)	
within	screening	programmes,	which	could	be	useful	in	informing	the	current	
approach.		
	
The	UK	NSP	pays	considerable	attention	to	clarity	of	purpose,	systematic	delivery,	
quality	assurance,	informed	participation,	equity,	ethical	oversight,	building	trust,	
public	understanding,	and	safeguarding	decision	making	from	political	and	
commercial	interference.	This	is	because	of	major	adverse	incidents,	and	public	and	
professional	outcry,	on	numerous	occasions	before	1996	when	the	UK	NSC	was	
established,	that	stemmed	from	these	matters	being	overlooked.		
	
We	outline	briefly	below	some	features	that	CDC	testing	and	NSP’s	have	in	common,	
and	what	implications	this	might	have	for	testing	during	the	pandemic.	
	
3.1	Clarity	of	purpose	
If	there	is	ambiguity	and	confusion	about	exactly	why,	when,	and	for	what	purpose	a	
given	test	is	being	performed,	this	leads	to	problems.	COVID-19	testing	was	initially	
directed	for	patients	with	symptoms,	but	then	shifted	to	being	used	to	confirm	
absence	of	infection	in	symptomless,	i.e.	healthy	people.	When	there	is	confusion	
about	aims,	and	about	how	well	a	test	can	fulfill	that	aim,	this	tends	to	lead	to	
misinformation,	waste	of	resources,	and	loss	of	public	and	professional	confidence	in	
the	programme.	For	example,	decades	ago	when	Downs	Syndrome	screening	first	
began,	the	professional	view	was	that	the	aim	was	to	prevent	the	birth	of	children	
with	the	syndrome.	This	aim	was	unethical,	and	inappropriate,	and	led	to	huge	
difficulties.	In	relation	to	COVID-19	testing,	the	announcement	that	100,000	tests	
were	to	be	done	each	day	led	to	an	unintended	shift	in	the	purpose	of	testing	-	to	a	
focus	on	meeting	the	target	rather	than	on	providing	benefit.	The	result	was	that	
many	tests	were	done	that	were	irrelevant	to	meeting	the	objective	of	avoiding	
unnecessary	self-isolation	in	symptomless	key	workers.		
	
Implication	for	best	practice;	it	is	good	to	be	crystal	clear	on	the	ultimate	
purpose	of	a	given	test	in	a	given	setting,	and	on	the	evidence	that	
demonstrates	that	the	given	purpose	can	be	met.		
	
3.2	It	needs	a	system	not	just	a	test	
A	system	is	a	set	of	interlinked	activities	with	a	collective	purpose.	A	testing	
programme	will	not	fully	meet	its	objectives	unless	there	is	a	coordinated	pathway;	
encompassing	identifying	who	to	test,	communicating	the	need	for	a	test,	taking	the	
test,	carrying	out	the	test,	communicating	the	result	to	the	person	tested	and	to	
others	who	need	to	know,	and	ensuring	that	appropriate	next	steps	actually	happen.	
It	appears	at	present	in	the	pandemic	that	parallel	systems	are	being	created,	with	
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commercial	companies	taking	on	functions	that	can	only	be	effective	if	they	are	
delivered	by	appropriately	trained	staff,	to	clear	quality	standards,	and	integrated	
within	existing	primary	care,	secondary	care	and	public	health	services.	Accurate	and	
secure	recording	is	needed,	with	appropriate	and	timely	sharing	of	information	
between	different	agencies,	safeguards	for	confidentiality	of	personally	identifiable	
data,	measurement	and	reporting	on	quality	standards	for	the	entire	system.	In	the	
early	years	of	cervical	screening	for	example	(1960s-1980)	there	were	no	effective	
systems	in	place	for	any	part	of	the	pathway,	mortality	benefit	was	not	realized,	
harmful	treatments	were	delivered	to	many	who	did	not	need	it,	and	systems	for	
following	up	people	with	abnormal	test	results	were	incomplete	and	disjointed2.	
These	same	issues	are	appearing	in	the	mass	testing	programme	for	COVID-19.		
	
Implication	for	best	practice;	it	is	beneficial	to	specify	the	whole	system,	
together	with	measures	of	quality	relating	to	the	objectives	for	each	step	in	
the	pathway.		
	
3.3	The	people	tested	are	healthy,	and	are	not	patients	
Whenever	a	test	is	offered	or	required	in	someone	who	has	not	sought	help	for	signs	
or	symptoms,	the	nature	of	the	healthworker/patient	relationship	and	of	the	
contract	between	them	changes	from	traditional	diagnosis	or	disease	management.	
This	is	significant	because	the	person	being	tested	may	derive	no	benefit,	and	may	
suffer	harm	directly	or	through	unintended	consequences	of	uncertain	information.	
As	COVID-19	testing	shifts	to	testing	symptomless	people,	the	impacts	if	the	testing	
if	not	done	well	could	included	diversion	of	resources,	and	inadvertent	infection	
transmission	from	false	reassurance.		
	
Implication	for	best	practice;	provision	of	information	to	those	tested,	that	
explains	the	consequences,	both	harmful	and	beneficial,	and	gives	ethical	
justification,	is	important	for	building	public	trust,	and	is	a	requirement	of	
General	Medical	Council	guidance3.	It	is	good	to	be	explicit	about	whether	a	
test	is	primarily	for	gathering	surveillance	data,	or	for	research,	or	for	
protecting	others,	or	for	slowing	transmission,	or	primarily	for	the	direct	
benefit	of	the	recipient.	This	is	of	particular	importance	with	antibody	testing	
done	for	surveillance,	because	the	recipient	may	believe	the	test	is	for	their	
benefit	and	put	undue	reliance	on	the	assumed	immunity.	
	
3.4	Test	performance,	what	the	test	actually	measures,	and	what	the	results	really	
mean	are	of	critical	importance	
Decades	of	harm	and	confusion	have	been	caused	by	wrong	assumptions	about	the	
meaning	of	screening	test	results.	To	give	an	example,	before	the	UK	NSP	
successfully	improved	the	quality	standards	for	Downs	syndrome	screening,	many	
terminations	of	unaffected	pregnancies	took	place	on	the	basis	of	falsely	positive	
results4.		
	
The	principle	of	linking	test	results,	to	treatment	decisions,	to	outcomes	both	for	the	
person	tested	and	for	others,	is	fully	established	in	policy-making	for	medical	tests	
and	screening	programmes.	It	forms	part	of	the	evaluation	processes	of	NICE,	the	UK	
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National	Screening	Committee,	the	US	Preventive	Services	Task	Force	and	the	
Australian	MSAC	amongst	others.	The	linkage	of	test	results	to	actions	to	outcomes	
is	one	of	the	cornerstones	of	ensuring	that	medical	tests	and	screening	programmes	
lead	to	more	good	than	harm.	Applying	these	principles	to	COVID-19	tests	highlights	
two	critical	issues.	Firstly,	PCR	is	known	to	miss	many	cases	(low	sensitivity),	so	
advising	a	symptomatic	person	with	a	single	negative	PCR	test	that	they	and	their	
contacts	no	longer	need	to	self-isolate	has	the	potential	for	considerable	harm	
through	onward	transmission.	WHO	guidance	is	clear	that	even	two	consecutive	
negative	PCR	tests	does	not	rule	out	COVID-195.		Secondly,	we	do	not	yet	know	
whether	presence	of	antibodies	infers	immunity,	and	if	it	does,	how	that	changes	
over	time.	If	an	individual	tests	positive	for	antibodies,	and	mistakenly	believes	that	
they	are	immune	to	COVID-19	and/or	cannot	transmit	it	they	may	change	their	
behaviour	to	increase	the	risk	of	infection	and	transmission,	including	to	vulnerable	
people.	Further	detail	of	test	performance	and	evaluations	is	in	Appendix	2.		
	
Implication	for	best	practice;	it	is	important	to	question	any	test	
implementation	where	it	is	unclear	how	receiving	the	test	is	of	benefit	to	the	
individual,	their	contacts	and	the	population.	Further,	as	health	professionals,	
we	tend	to	use	language	that	is	easily	understood	in	health	circles,	but	this	
can	lead	to	misunderstanding	for	journalists	or	members	of	the	public.	Words	
need	to	be	used	as	carefully	as	algebraic	equations,	for	example	‘live	virus’	
testing	is	a	misleading	term,	since	a	positive	PCR	test	could	result	from	
presence	of	degraded	viral	RNA	fragment	persisting	in	someone	who	is	not	
infectious.	Numbers,	as	Gigerenzer	has	demonstrated6,	are	best	expressed	
simply	–	not	as	decimals	or	percentages	but	in	natural	frequencies,	and	using	
absolute	risks	not	relative	risks.	Uncertainty	is	best	acknowledged.			
	
3.5	Public	trust,	public	understanding,	and	public	cooperation	
UK	experience	suggests	that	an	authoritarian	or	paternalistic	approach	to	testing	
healthy	people	will,	sooner	or	later,	backfire.	The	UK	population	is	highly	diverse	in	
terms	of	livelihoods,	literacy,	beliefs,	cultural	background,	class	etc.	When	testing	
millions	of	people,	the	subtlety	and	nuance	encompassed	in	ordinary	day	to	day,	
human	to	human,	interactions	with	local	health	service	workers	gets	lost.	This	makes	
it	difficult	to	communicate	in	a	way	that	enables	people	to	feel	they	are	being	
treated	as	human	beings,	and	the	result	can	be	anger,	bitterness,	complaints,	and	
legal	challenge.	For	example	in	the	breast	screening	programme,	beginning	in	1988,	
women	were	initially	encouraged	to	attend	without	being	told	that	overdiagnosis	
and	overtreatment	inevitably	occur	for	some	screened	women.	This	led	to	fierce	
controversy	before	the	information	was	changed	to	include	overtreatment7.		
	
Implication	for	best	practice;	communication	needs	to	be	sufficiently	honest,	
clear	and	accurate,	that	it	will	be	trusted	irrespective	of	whether	the	
recipient	of	the	testing	programme	is	someone	below	living	wage	caring	for	a	
terminally	ill	relative,	a	professor	of	medical	ethics,	or	an	asylum	seeker	
whose	first	language	is	not	English.	Primary	care	services	need	to	be	involved	
and	informed	so	that	they	can	support	people	who	receive	tests.	
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Trust	and	collaboration	between	agencies	
In	both	CDC	testing	and	NSP	testing	there	are	numerous	different	agencies	
conducting	different	elements	of	the	system.	Trust,	good	relationships,	a	shared	
public	service	ethic,	and	a	universal	commitment	to	quality	assurance,	is	important	
for	achieving	best	practice.		
	
Implication	for	best	practice;	standards	relating	to	confidentiality	for	
personally	identifiable	data,	research	governance,	and	collection/reporting	of	
performance	data	relating	to	quality	standards,	need	to	apply	across	all	
organisations	participating	in	testing	programmes	for	COVID-19.	The	
pandemic	has	led	to	many	normal	rules	being	relaxed,	which	has	helped	clear	
the	way	for	rapid	action,	but	if	all	rules	of	best	practice	are	ignored	then	
harm	will	result.		
	
3.6	The	inverse	care	law	applies	
Those	who	are	most	able	to	understand	and	access	tests	are	generally	those	who	are	
also	healthy,	well	to	do,	and	less	vulnerable.	For	example	before	1988	the	cervical	
screening	programme	had	no	call	and	recall	system,	with	the	result	that	lowest	risk	
women	had	very	frequent	tests,	and	high	risk	women	had	none	at	all.	For	COVID-19,	
if	testing	is	haphazardly	delivered	there	is	a	risk	of	devoting	considerable	resource	
with	little	beneficial	effect.		
	
Implication	for	best	practice;	processes	are	needed	to	ensure	that	tests	are	
directed	at	people	and	contexts	where	benefit	will	ensue,	and	quality	
measures	need	to	relate	to	specific	objectives	and	not	just	to	the	number	of	
tests	and	to	turnaround	times.	Attending	to	sound	evidence	that	tests	can	
achieve	what	we	want	them	to	achieve,	and	attention	to	cost-benefit,	can	
also	help.	Close	working	with	voluntary	sector	and	civic	society	in	every	
locality	can	also	be	helpful;	the	relationships	between	statutory,	sector,	
voluntary	sector	and	civic	society	appear	to	have	strengthened	during	the	
pandemic	so	far.	Strong	local	participation	can	help	mitigate	the	divisive	
influence	of	the	current	political	climate.	
	
3.7	Political,	media,	and	commercial	factors	
Where	healthy	people	are	concerned,	there	is	no	shortage	of	vociferous	opinions	
about	what	tests	should	or	not	be	available.	This	applies	both	for	screening	and	for	
communicable	disease	control.	Public	relations	activities	by	companies	with	vested	
interests,	usually	enacted	covertly,	play	a	part	in	influencing	the	media,	politicians,	
and	the	public.	For	example	in	2007,	journalists	and	celebrities	were	flown	from	
across	the	world	to	attend	what	appeared	to	be	a	scientific	‘Global	Summit’	on	
cervical	cancer	prevention;	in	truth	the	event	was	stage	managed	entirely	on	behalf	
of	Sanofi	Pasteur	with	the	aim	of	lobbying	for	HPV	vaccine	ahead	of	mature	research	
evidence8.	And	in	2019	a	legal	challenge	began	against	Roche	for	their	allegedly	
fraudulent	promotion	of	Tamiflu	for	H1N1	flu9.	There	seems	little	doubt	that	
commercial	interests	will	be	at	play	in	the	handling	of	the	current	pandemic.	The	
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difficulty	of	making	careful	and	well-founded	policy	recommendations	in	this	
environment	is	considerable.		
	
Implication	for	best	practice;	Independent	SAGE	can	be	exemplars,	so	that	
the	members	themselves,	and	the	conduct	of	the	group	as	a	whole,	remains	
above	criticism.	This	will	ensure	that	the	group	is	in	a	position	to	‘call	out’	
conflicts	of	interests	and	poor	practice.		
	
3.8	Direct-to-Consumer	advertising	
COVID-19	PCR	tests	and	antibody	tests	are	being	advertised	direct	to	consumers	in	
the	UK.	Information	provided	on	the	websites	selling	these	tests	is	incomplete,	and	
in	some	cases	dangerously	misleading.	The	marketing	of	tests	direct	to	the	public	is	
governed	only	by	the	Advertising	Standards	Authority	and	few	safeguards	exist	to	
prevent	misleading	information	about	implied	benefits10.	This	is	a	serious	concern	in	
the	screening	world	also.	
	
Implication	for	best	practice;	clear,	impartial,	plain	English	information	for	
the	public,	based	on	best	evidence,	issued	by	an	independent	and	trusted	
source,	and	readily	available	through	social	media	and	other	channels,	can	
help	to	protect	ordinary	citizens	from	misleading	marketing	claims	about	
medical	tests	and	interventions.		
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Appendix	1.	Key	differences;	timescale,	flexibility,	purpose,	approach,	and	
ethical/legal	framework,	in	relation	CDC	testing	and	NSP	testing.	
	
	 Communicable	disease	control	
(CDC)	testing	
National	Screening	Programmes	
(NSP)	
Timescale	 Notifications	and	surveillance	
systems	have	evolved	over	
centuries,	but	for	a	new	infectious	
agent,	time	is	of	the	essence,	and	
testing	programmes	need	to	be	
delivered	extremely	rapidly	in	
response	to	a	threat.	
Preparedness	can	help.		
Screening	programmes	are	major	
undertakings,	testing	millions	of	
people	(12	million	screened	by	
the	England	NSP	in	2017/18).	It	
needs	a	decade	or	more	to	
research	and	implement	a	high	
quality	programme.		
Flexibility	 Testing	programmes	during	an	
epidemic	or	outbreak	are	
introduced	and	then	scaled	down.	
Rushed	implementation	can	cause	
an	expensive	and	damaging	mess,	
but	will	not	be	‘set	in	stone’	in	the	
same	way	as	for	a	national	
screening	programme.			
It	is	extremely	hard	to	modify	or	
cease	a	screening	programme	
once	it	is	started.	Rushing	into	
screening	without	prior	
evaluation	and	careful	
implementation	(as	happened	
with	cervical	screening	in	the	
1960s)	creates	a	damaging,	
expensive,	long-lasting	mess.	
Purpose	 Tests	are	done	for	multiple	
purposes,	including;	
SURVEILLANCE	(prevalence	and	
incidence	monitoring	of	agent	and	
disease	as	part	of	the	CDC	
programme	)	RESEARCH	(into	
transmission,	morbidity,	mortality,	
treatment,	immunity,	prevention	
is	part	of	the	CDC	programme)	
DIAGNOSIS	(to	guide	treatment	
during	illness)	PROTECTION	OF	
OTHERS	(e.g	testing	aimed	at	
ensuring	vulnerable	people	are	
not	exposed	to	infectious	
individuals)	PREVENTION	OF	
TRANSMISSION	(e.g.	testing	those	
travelling	into	ports	of	entry),	
CASE	FINDING	in	order	to	offer	
prompt	treatment,	and	CONTACT	
TRACING	–	although	the	‘test’	in	
this	case	may	consist	of	questions	
about	contact	rather	than	a	
medical	test.		
A	screening	programme	generally	
has	a	single,	explicit	purpose	–	to	
reduce	chance	of	a	specific	
unwanted	future	outcome	for	the	
screened	individual	(e.g.	reducing	
risk	of	death	from	ruptured	aortic	
aneurysm).	Research	to	first	
evaluate	the	consequences	of	
screening	is	done	separately,	and	
covered	by	research	governance.	
Epidemiological	research	such	as	
morbidity	surveys	and	disease	
surveillance	are	also	carried	out	
separately.	In	the	early	days,	poor	
quality	screening	was	often	
‘nodded	through’	because	of	a	
desire	to	gather	morbidity	
statistics	relating	to	symptomless	
people.	This	lead	to	problems	due	
to	public	expectations	that	
screening	was	proven,	harm	
through	inconsequential	findings	
etc.	
Approach	 A	variety	of	approaches	to	testing	
are	practiced,	and	evolve,	across	
National	programmes	are	highly	
uniform,	and	universally	
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time	and	place,	according	to	a)	
level	of	circulating	infection	b)	
nature	of	population	e.g.	social	
and	ethnic	mix,	mobility,	
vulnerability	etc.	c)	configuration	
and	capacity	of	local	services.	
Testing	is	only	one	element,	with	
many	other	control	measures,	
pharmaceutical	and	non-
pharmaceutical,	also	applying.		
Also,	considerable	reliance	is	
placed	on	a	single	test	result,	with	
no	confirmatory	step,	Also	
infections	arise	all	the	time	
therefore	someone	can	become	
infected	immediately	after	having	
a	test,	with	misleading	
conclusions.		
provided.	This	practice	was	
adopted	because	early	haphazard	
screening	programmes	led	to	
criticisms	of	unfairness,	and	to	
escalation	of	overdiagnosis	and	
harmful	overtreatment.	Without	
uniform	standards	clinicians	had	
to	‘play	safe’	or	risk	being	
criticized	for	inevitable	
undetectable	cases.	Also,	in	
screening	programmes	there	is	
usually	a	further	diagnostic	phase	
to	examine	in	more	detail	those	
whose	initial	screen	result	is	
positive.	
Ethical/	
legal	
framework	
Testing	in	CDC	programmes	is	
generally	a	recommendation	
rather	than	an	offer.	Some	tests	
are	required,	for	example	for	
certain	employees,	visas	etc.	The	
Public	Health	(Control	of	Disease)	
Act	1984	gives	certain	powers	to	
Local	Authorities.	In	practice,	
these	powers	are	exercised	
through	persuasion,	appeal	to	
duty,	power	to	exclude	from	work,	
payment	vouchers,	assistance	with	
accessing	tests	etc.	and	enacted	by	
Environmental	Health	Officers,	
health	service	staff	or	social	care	
workers,	rather	than	through	
forceful	means	involving	police	
officers.		
For	most	of	the	National	
Screening	Programmes	the	
screening	is	an	‘offer’	with	strong	
emphasis	on	informed	choice	
given	that	screening	leads	to	
harm	as	well	as	to	potential	
benefit.	For	infectious	disease	
screening	in	pregnancy	(HIV,	Hep	
B,	syphilis)	screening	is	
‘recommended’,	and	for	newborn	
bloodspot	‘strongly	
recommended’.	Up	until	2001	a	
more	persuasive	approach	was	
practiced,	and	in	the	1960s-1990s	
people	were	not	given	real	
choice.	It	took	decades	of	
challenge	from	lawyers,	ethicists,	
NHS	staff,	and	citizens	before	the	
principle	of	informed	choice	was	
fully	recognised.		
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Appendix	2:	Test	accuracy	and	implications	of	results	
	
The	World	Health	Organisation	and	the	Cochrane	Collaboration	are	working	together	
to	systematically	review	the	evidence	about	the	accuracy	of	COVID-19	molecular	
tests,	mostly	polymerase	chain	reaction	(PCR)	and	antibody	tests)11.	These	will	be	
published	in	the	coming	weeks.		
	
The	testing	pathways	using	PCR	and	antibody	tests	in	the	UK	have	not	been	
evaluated	by	NICE	or	the	UK	National	Screening	Committee.	However,	NICE	have	
produced	a	best	practice	guide	for	undertaking	COVID-19	test	evaluation	studies12.	
In	this	they	recommend	evaluating	test	accuracy	in	real-world	practice	(single	gate	
studies)	rather	than	just	in	the	laboratory	on	known	samples	and	pre-pandemic	sera	
(two	gate	studies)13.	This	is	because	two	gate	studies	tend	to	include	extreme	cases	
so	overestimate	accuracy.	These	evaluations	of	the	antibody	test	are	underway	in	
the	UK	currently.	The	UK	roll-out	of	the	antibody	test	was	based	on	two	gate	
laboratory	studies.		
	
The	evidence	to	date	is	that	laboratory	based	antibody	tests	using	venous	blood	
have	good	(but	not	perfect)	accuracy	to	detect	previous	infection.	This	accuracy	is	
heavily	dependent	on	time	since	infection.	The	implications	of	this	accuracy	for	
positive	predictive	value	are	heavily	dependent	on	disease	prevalence.		
	
Below	are	some	pathways	by	which	use	of	the	PCR	test	and	antibody	test	may	
benefit	and	harm	the	people	tested	and	others.		
	
1. PCR	positive:	The	intended	use	of	the	PCR	test	is	to	detect	people	who	
currently	have	active	COVID-19	virus,	who	may	infect	others.	The	action	in	
this	case	is	to	isolate	the	person	who	tests	positive,	to	prevent	infection	of	
others,	and	this	reduction	of	transmission	in	turn	reduces	COVID-19	related	
mortality	and	morbidity.	A	further	action	which	could	beneficially	reduce	
mortality	and	morbidity	is	tracking	and	tracing	the	contacts	of	the	confirmed	
case.	This	is	a	clear	pathway	to	benefit	from	the	test.		
2. PCR	negative:	The	PCR	test	has	low	sensitivity,	so	there	are	many	false	
negative	results	(undetected	cases).	If	symptomatic	people	who	test	negative	
are	allowed	to	end	self-isolation	this	is	very	likely	to	result	in	significant	
transmission,	and	the	associated	mortality	and	morbidity	harm.	The	World	
Health	Organisation	laboratory	guidelines14	state	COVID-19	cannot	be	ruled	
out	even	after	two	consecutive	negative	PCR	tests.	On	that	basis	the	policy	in	
New	Zealand	is	a	requirement	for	three	consecutive	negative	PCR	tests	
before	COVID-19	is	ruled	out.	To	prevent	unnecessary	transmission	a	
symptomatic	person	who	tests	negative	once	on	PCR	should	continue	to	self-
isolate.	If	symptomatic	people	who	test	PCR	negative	end	self-isolation	this	
will	increase	transmission	and	may	undermine	the	benefits	of	introducing	the	
test.	
3. Antibody	test	positive:	We	do	not	know	whether	the	presence	of	antibodies	
confers	immunity	from	re-infection	with	COVID-19.	If	an	individual	tests	
positive	for	antibodies,	and	misunderstands	that	result,	they	may	put	
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themselves	at	greater	risk	of	infection	and	transmission	to	others	based	on	
the	mistaken	assumption	that	they	are	immune.	There	is	currently	no	
obvious	pathway	to	benefit	from	the	antibody	testing	programme.	There	is	
potential	for	a	large	national	experiment,	where	infection	rates	in	people	
with	previous	positive	and	negative	antibody	test	results	are	recorded,	to	
help	us	understand	the	relationship	between	antibodies	and	immunity.	This	
however	would	need	to	be	clearly	explained	to	the	research	participants	
taking	the	test.		
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